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BEYOND THE BOSSES’ CONSTITUTION: 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CLASS ENTRENCHMENT 
Jedediah Purdy * 
The Supreme Court’s “weaponized” First Amendment has been its 
strongest antiregulatory tool in recent decades, slashing campaign-
finance regulation, public-sector union financing, and pharmaceutical 
regulation, and threatening a broader remit. Along with others, I have 
previously criticized these developments as a “new Lochnerism.” In this 
Essay, part of a Columbia Law Review Symposium, I press beyond 
these criticisms to diagnose the ideological outlook of these opinions and 
to propose an alternative. The leading decisions of the antiregulatory 
First Amendment often associate free speech with a vision of market effi-
ciency; but, I argue, closer to their heart is antistatist fear of entrench-
ment by elected officials, interest groups, and bureaucrats. These opinions 
limit the power of government to implement distributional judgments in 
key areas of policy and, by thus tying the government’s hands, constrain 
opportunities for entrenchment. This antidistributive deployment of 
market-protecting policy is the signature of neoliberal jurisprudence. 
But this jurisprudence has deep problems in an order of capitalist 
democracy such as ours. Whenever the state cannot implement distribu-
tional judgments, markets will do so instead. Market distributions are, 
empirically speaking, highly unequal, and these inequalities produce 
their own kind of entrenchment—class entrenchment for the wealthy. A 
jurisprudence that aims at government neutrality by tying the distribu-
tional hands of the state cannot achieve neutrality but instead implicitly 
sides with market inequality over distinctively democratic forms of 
equality. Once we see that any constitutional vision involves some rela-
tionship between the “democratic” and the “capitalist” parts of capitalist 
democracy, it becomes possible not just to criticize the Court’s siding with 
market winners but also to ask what kinds of equality-pursuing policies 
the Constitution must permit to reset that balance in favor of democracy. 
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Although the Supreme Court’s “weaponiz[ed]” First Amendment1 
often comes dressed in rhetoric associating political and civic life with an 
idealized market, it is aimed less at advancing a perfect market than at 
impeding very imperfect politics. It aims centrally at averting partisan 
and bureaucratic entrenchment—at preventing political elites from 
picking future winners from among candidates, parties, and policies.2 
The problem is that, even if it accomplishes this (a question this Essay does 
not attempt to answer), it does so at the cost of supporting class entrench-
ment: the concentration of political power in a relatively small and 
privileged echelon of Americans.3 It does so by constitutionally protecting 
the translation of unequal wealth into unequal political power. This Essay 
aims to illuminate the premises about the political economy of capitalist 
democracy that make these doctrinal outcomes plausible and even seem-
ingly obvious, and to advance an alternative approach. 
The Court has put an antidistributional principle at the center of 
today’s First Amendment doctrine: “[T]he concept that government may 
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance 
the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment . . . .”4 
This per curiam anathema on official distributional judgments in regulat-
ing speech—in this instance, the spending of personal wealth in electoral 
                                                                                                                           
 1. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 2. See infra Part I. 
 3. See infra section II.A. 
 4. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam). 
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advocacy5—has echoed down from the 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo to 
vindicate corporate campaign spending in Citizens United v. FEC 6 and 
invalidate conditional public financing in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,7 among other consequences.8 Prohibiting 
certain kinds of political choices about distribution, especially of political 
influence itself, has become a key doctrinal tool for defining government 
neutrality under the First Amendment.9 Its effect, however, is not to avoid 
distributional decisions but to hand them off implicitly to markets. 
An effective response must make the case for active democratic 
engagement with the terms of political power itself, centrally including 
the political power that arises from economic power. It must say what 
kind of interaction a democratic republic should build between eco-
nomic and political power, and for what reasons. It must offer, that is, a 
political economy of power. This Essay thus moves from reconstructing 
the worldview that supports certain doctrines to addressing the question 
of what arrangement of market power and political power First Amendment 
doctrine should aim to cultivate. 
Part I of this Essay elaborates the argument sketched above regard-
ing the structure and sources of the Court’s campaign-finance cases. Part 
II develops an alternative picture of the most important distortion of 
democracy in recent decades: the class entrenchment of the wealthy in 
political influence. Turning to the question of what political economy of 
power is desirable in a democratic republic, this Essay proposes that a 
democratic republic must be able to achieve political will formation 
around a creditable idea of the common good. This goal requires a 
modicum of civic equality, which in turn requires that the polity be able 
to set the terms of its own will formation—that is, to legislate on the for-
mation and distribution of political influence, the very topic the current 
Court puts out of bounds. The Essay goes on to suggest that this doctri-
nal pursuit of civic equality should take notice—as the Court’s current 
jurisprudence furtively does—of the political-economic order it aims to 
make possible, here one of stronger democracy and greater equality and 
security. One might call it a social-democratic jurisprudence. In contrast, 
the Court’s recent First Amendment jurisprudence, with its conceptual 
annulment and practical embrace of class entrenchment, has produced a 
bosses’ Constitution. Part III develops this approach further through the 
First Amendment cases addressing public-sector union fees. 
                                                                                                                           
 5. See id. at 7. 
 6. See 558 U.S. 310, 349–50, 365 (2010) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49). 
 7. See 564 U.S. 721, 727–28, 741 (2011) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49). 
 8. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–42, 1450 (2014) (citing Buckley, 
424 U.S. at 48–49) (invalidating a statutory limit on aggregate campaign contributions). 
 9. See infra Part I. 
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I. THE COURT’S POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPEECH 
A.  Speech, Democracy, and Entrenchment 
The Court’s reasoning in the political-spending cases adopts a meta-
phor of public, political speech as occurring in an efficient market, “the 
‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment,” in which 
“ideas ‘may compete’ . . . ‘without government interference.’”10 In this 
marketplace, electoral “expenditure is political speech presented to the 
electorate,” an offering that “presupposes that the people have the 
ultimate influence over elected officials.”11 The purpose of the adver-
tising is “advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their 
interests.”12 Within this image, political speech (including spending) is 
thus “an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold 
officials accountable to the people” by presenting voters with competing 
accounts of their situation and interests.13 So understood, speech is the 
cornerstone of “a republic where the people are sovereign.”14 
These passages bolster decisions holding that limits on campaign 
spending may not be constitutionally justified as measures to reduce “dis-
tortion” of political power or “corruption” in the form of undue political 
influence.15 The Court’s praise of advertising’s service to democracy is a 
buttress for the view that government must not be allowed to make distri-
butional judgments concerning political speech and influence because 
“[l]eveling electoral opportunities means making and implementing 
judgments about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the 
outcome of an election . . . , and it is a dangerous business for Congress to 
use the election laws to influence the voters’ choices.”16 It is avoiding this 
summum malum that powers the praise of political advertising and market-
style voter choices as a democratic summum bonum. The Court treats 
elections and political debate as if they were perfect markets because this 
premise secures them against the vices of political rent seeking. 
The Court’s jurisprudence, accordingly, is not invested in the thorough-
going coherence or adequacy of the market metaphor. As Professor David 
Grewal and I have emphasized elsewhere, modern arguments favoring 
private economic power over democratic countermeasures tend to have 
shifting, overlapping aspects: affirmative idealization of the efficiency of 
                                                                                                                           
 10. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez 
Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008)). 
 11. Id. at 360. 
 12. Id. at 354. 
 13. Id. at 339. 
 14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam). 
 15. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–61 (rejecting the antidistortion and anti-
corruption rationales for regulating corporate political speech). 
 16. Id. at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 
724, 742 (2008)). 
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market arrangements; moralized identification of the rights and 
transactions of the marketplace as uniquely compatible with liberty, 
equality, and dignity; a tragic register insisting that the predictable 
deficiencies of politics generally, or certain democratic institutions in 
particular, prevent them from doing better than markets can, even if we 
might wish otherwise; and a preargumentative “common-sense” dimension 
that implicitly dismisses certain alternatives as “off the table” before the 
serious argument has begun.17 It is typical to move among these different 
registers almost unselfconsciously because they hang together as an 
ideological worldview. Indeed, besides their praise of markets and 
denigration of politics, the political-spending opinions invoke the “worth” 
and “voice” of speakers, as if corporations were marginalized populations 
in search of dignity, and liberally invoke the language of 
nondiscrimination, almost reflexively borrowing the moral language of 
First Amendment liberties.18 So the Citizens United Court announced of 
the corporate-spending ban, “The censorship we now confront is vast in 
its reach . . . [and] ‘muffle[s] the voices that best represent the most 
significant segments of the economy.’”19 In these opinions, however, 
avoiding the pathologies of politics is the keystone. 
The implicit standpoint of the campaign-finance cases, then, is the 
following: The constitutional evil to be avoided is manipulation by the 
political class of the rules for later elections, which would “deprive the 
public of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and 
speakers are worthy of consideration” and will receive majoritarian 
endorsement.20 Seen in this way, limiting campaign spending is a usurp-
ing attempt to predetermine the course of democratic self-rule, just like 
prohibiting antiwar pamphleteering or banning Karl Marx’s writings.21 
The Court’s way of averting this hazard involves it in a certain view of 
democratic will formation. In this latter view, voting decisions are fairly 
characterized on the paradigm of the fully informed economic agent of 
neoclassical modeling, who gratefully accepts the helpful data that adver-
tising provides.22 This upbeat idea that the wealthy, whether through the 
                                                                                                                           
 17. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 
Law & Contemp. Probs., no. 4, 2014, at 1, 6–7. 
 18. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–41 (“By taking the right to speak from some 
and giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the 
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s 
voice.”). 
 19. Id. at 354 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment in part)). 
 20. Id. at 341. 
 21. See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 256–57 (arguing that the First Amendment should protect, among other 
things, philosophy and public discussions of public issues because of their importance to 
self-government). 
 22. See generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. 
Econ. 99, 99 (1955) (“Traditional economic theory postulates an ‘economic man,’ who, in 
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corporate form or otherwise, are simply submitting arguments for assess-
ment by their fellow citizens, is not an empirical claim about political 
persuasion and judgment. It is a half-theoretical, half-rhetorical premise. 
Current First Amendment doctrine tends toward this premise in good 
part to avoid a square confrontation with the problems that arise from its 
rejection of explicit distributional judgments concerning political influence. 
B.  A Theoretical and Historical Origin Point for the Court’s View 
The judicial outlook sketched above emerged before the rise of the 
“conservative legal movement” that today furnishes many of its spokes-
persons on the bench.23 Its early articulation arose from a shared sense of 
the distinctive problems of capitalist democracy and the role of a consti-
tutional order in mitigating them. The social and intellectual world of its 
early spokespersons was the end of the post–World War II “great excep-
tion,” the last years of a period of widely shared growth, the flattest 
distributions of wealth and income the country has seen, and a strong 
role for organized labor in the Keynesian management of the national 
economy.24 
From the point of view of the worried center-right, the postwar era 
presented a threat: Too much political control of the economy, bolstered 
by unions and by the left, would stifle personal liberty and initiative, 
leading to some combination of stagnation and tyranny.25 The influence 
of this perspective on elite legal culture was evident in Justice Powell’s 
1971 memorandum to Eugene Sydnor of the Chamber of Commerce, 
written shortly before his nomination to the Supreme Court, in which 
Powell called for a full-court press by business in politics, universities, 
media, and the courts for “the preservation of the system [of free 
enterprise] itself.”26 Justice Powell’s memo crystallized a development in 
twentieth-century conservative jurisprudence that has come to full flower 
                                                                                                                           
the course of being ‘economic’ is also ‘rational.’ This man is assumed to have knowledge 
of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if not absolutely complete, is at least 
impressively clear and voluminous.”). 
 23. See generally Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement 
(2008) (charting the development, since the 1970s, of the “conservative legal movement” 
into a “sophisticated and deeply organized network”). 
 24. See Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, 
at xiii–xiv (Patrick Camiller & David Fernbach trans., 2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter Streeck, 
Buying Time]; David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, 18 Theoretical 
Inquiries L. 61, 61–67 (2017) [hereinafter Grewal & Purdy, Inequality] (describing the eco-
nomic growth and optimism that prevailed in the three decades following World War II). 
 25. See Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen’s Crusade Against the 
New Deal 150–212 (2010) (describing business interests’ mobilization of ideas against the 
regulatory state in the late 1960s and 1970s). 
 26. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Educ. 
Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce 30 (Aug. 23, 1971) [hereinafter Powell Memorandum] 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
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in the twenty-first: an across-the-board resistance to the politics of 
distribution, in which political spending plays a central role. 
The fear of state-led distribution has been a frequently renewed 
resource in U.S. politics since James Madison’s warnings against redis-
tributive “factions” in Federalist No. 10.27 It defined the right wing of the 
classically liberal Republican Party in the first Gilded Age, and the 
Liberty League and other opponents of the New Deal recast it for their 
purposes.28 When the conservative Reader’s Digest published a polemical 
summary of libertarian economist Friedrich Hayek’s already polemical 
The Road to Serfdom, an antistatist beachhead was announced at the apex 
of America’s (always incomplete and racially stratified) closest approach 
to social democracy.29 Hayek and his fellow Chicago economist Milton 
Friedman (whom Powell admiringly quoted in his 1971 memo30) brought 
to the defense of markets theoretical sophistication and, especially in 
Hayek’s case, the ambition to synoptic social theory.31 By the early 1970s, 
these thinkers, like Powell, were developing the neoliberal response to a 
cross-national wave of labor militancy, social-movement discontent, and 
inflationary pressures (the last widely seen as connected with organized 
labor’s expectation of regular wage hikes, even as productivity slowed),32 
which among thinkers of the second Frankfurt School came to be known 
as the West’s “legitimation crisis.”33 Hayek and his allies helped the reflec-
tive wing of American business to formulate an imperative to restore 
                                                                                                                           
 27. See The Federalist No. 10, at 53 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (warn-
ing against redistribution and debt relief as the signal threats of an unchecked local 
democracy). 
 28. See President Grover Cleveland, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1893) 
(“[Economic paternalism] perverts the patriotic sentiments of our countrymen and 
tempts them to pitiful calculation of . . . sordid gain . . . . It undermines the self-reliance of 
our people and substitutes in its place dependence upon governmental favoritism.”); 
Phillips-Fein, supra note 25, at 3–25 (detailing the mobilization of free-market ideas against 
the New Deal). 
 29. See Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets Since the 
Depression 87–122 (2012) (detailing the popularization and reception of Hayek’s thought 
and its role in conservative retrenchment against the New Deal); see also Grewal & Purdy, 
Inequality, supra note 24, at 66 (noting exceptions to the post–World War II “trend of 
economic inclusion,” such as African Americans). 
 30. See Powell Memorandum, supra note 26, at 5–6. 
 31. See, e.g., Friedrich A. Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice 107–32 (Phoenix ed. 
1978) (theorizing the nature and benefits of the market order). 
 32. See Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism [hereinafter Streeck, 
Crises], in How Will Capitalism End? 73, 77–78 (2016) [hereinafter Streeck, How Will 
Capitalism End?] (recounting the rise of labor militancy and inflation beginning in the 
late 1960s). 
 33. See Streeck, Buying Time, supra note 24, at 1–46 (recounting the “legitimation 
crisis” debates of the 1970s and criticizing their failure to anticipate the resilience of 
capitalism). 
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competitive pressure throughout the economy and, conversely, to roll 
back uses of the state that baffled or annulled market competition.34 
Hayek followed political economist Joseph Schumpeter and other 
skeptics of robust democracy in holding that such ideas as “society” and 
“the political community” were sentimental mystifications, and distribu-
tional politics a semiorganized form of looting.35 Hayek contended, 
moreover, that abandoning market coordination implied moving toward 
the only systemic alternative: outright political command of economic 
life.36 He thus worked out in theory the position that Powell adopted in 
his memo: 
The threat to the enterprise system . . . also is a threat to 
individual freedom.  
. . . . 
. . . [T]he only alternatives to free enterprise are varying 
degrees of bureaucratic regulation of individual freedom—
ranging from that under moderate socialism to the iron heel of 
the leftist or rightist dictatorship.  
. . . . 
. . . [F]reedom as a concept is indivisible. As the experience 
of the socialist and totalitarian states demonstrates, the 
contraction and denial of economic freedom is followed 
inevitably by governmental restrictions on other cherished 
rights.37 
Hayek argued that, if democracy were to be viable despite these deficien-
cies, the scope of politically open questions must be closely restricted—
specifically to exclude questions of distribution.38 
The Court’s worry about political entrenchment thus has a particu-
lar historical paradigm: the defense of market ordering, with its accompa-
nying liberties, against the self-perpetuating rule of a bureaucratic state 
acting on behalf of well-organized or ideologically sympathetic interest 
groups. Hayek and Friedman joined public-choice theorists such as 
Gordon Tullock and James Buchanan in warning against this political 
                                                                                                                           
 34. See, e.g., Burgin, supra note 29, at 186–213 (describing Friedman’s advocacy for 
laissez faire principles in the 1970s). 
 35. See Friedrich Hayek, ‘Social’ or Distributive Justice, in The Essence of Hayek 62, 
67 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984) (“I believe that ‘social justice’ will ulti-
mately be recognized as a will-o’-the-wisp which has lured men to abandon many of the 
values which in the past have inspired the development of civilization . . . .”). 
 36. See id. at 91–93 (arguing that the only alternative to market allocation in the 
social division of labor is, in effect, the conscription of some people in defense of the privi-
leges of others). 
 37. Powell Memorandum, supra note 26, at 32–33. 
 38. See Friedrich Hayek, Whither Democracy?, in The Essence of Hayek, supra note 
35, at 352, 357–58 (arguing for the construction of a government that systematically avoids 
distributional decisions because the “different treatment which is necessary in order to 
place people who are individually very different into the same material position seems . . . 
not only incompatible with personal freedom, but highly immoral”). 
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entrenchment as the distinctive hazard of democratic capitalism.39 The 
key to staving off this danger, it was influentially argued on the neoliberal 
right, was to cordon off questions of distribution from active political 
contestation. 
It was in this setting that the Court announced per curiam that the 
refusal of distributional judgments was the essential commitment of the 
Constitution’s protection of freedom of speech.40 When one tries picturing 
the goal of averting political redistribution as a jurisprudential keystone, 
other doctrinal developments form an arch around it. The affirmative 
action cases head off distributional judgments and political entrenchment 
along racial lines, as in the opinions of Justices O’Connor and Scalia in 
Croson 41 and Justice Roberts’s opinion in Parents Involved.42 The Court’s 
treatment of public-sector unions in Janus v. AFSCME (discussed in Part 
III) suggests a pair of touchstone worries: that the support of public-
sector unions might provide a means of political entrenchment, and that 
the political empowerment of such unions might enable them to foist 
ruinous distributional demands on local and state governments.43 The 
Spending Clause opinions in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius, especially the joint dissent of four conservative Justices, aim at 
heading off Congress’s imposing a redistributional form of social 
provision on the states via the power of general taxation.44 In short, the 
antidistributional nerve of Buckley and the subsequent campaign-finance 
cases connects that reasoning both to the rising neoliberal political 
economy of the 1970s and to a substantial body of post–Warren Court 
jurisprudence, from the Nixon appointees’ halt of Warren Court and 
Great Society egalitarianism to the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ rollback 
                                                                                                                           
 39. See generally James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: 
Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (1962) (arguing for a positive theory of 
politics and government based on the analysis of decision dynamics among self-interested 
actors), reprinted in 2 The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock (Charles K. Rowley ed., 
2004). 
 40. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 41. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–97 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (O’Connor, J.) (noting the danger of “simple racial politics” and the fact of 
Richmond’s majority-black city government as reasons for applying strict scrutiny to affirm-
ative action programs); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting the 
notion that governments may use racial classifications to ameliorate the effects of past 
discrimination). 
 42. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725–32 
(2007) (expressing “concern that racial balancing has ‘no logical stopping point’” and, if 
permitted, will embed racial proportionality permanently in American life (quoting 
Croson, 448 U.S. at 498)). 
 43. See infra notes 98–107 and accompanying text. 
 44. See 567 U.S. 519, 690–91, 706–07 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., 
dissenting) (arguing that federalism principles should prohibit Congress from requiring 
states to choose between adopting a federally funded social-provision policy, on the one 
hand, and funding their own while simultaneously funding other states’ federally subsi-
dized programs through federal taxes, on the other). 
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of the same. Constitutional resistance to redistribution is at the heart of 
this jurisprudence. 
This Part has diagnosed a set of premises about markets and demo-
cracy in the Court’s First Amendment doctrine and located an origin 
point for these in the political, economic, and legal debates of the early 
1970s. The next Part provides a larger context for explaining and 
assessing the Court’s First Amendment doctrine, as well as criteria for 
marking out a different, more egalitarian and democratic path forward. I 
argue that a capitalist democracy like that of the United States must man-
age two competing sets of imperatives: those of marginal productivity 
aimed at profit and those of social provision and self-rule. While the 
Justices who have shaped the current doctrine have seen chiefly the dan-
ger that politics poses to markets, the greater danger is the threat that 
capitalism’s dynamics pose to social provision and self-rule. Preserving 
democracy requires actively fostering the conditions for its success. The 
kind of redistributive policy that the Buckley Court made anathema is, in 
fact, indispensable. 
II. AN ALTERNATIVE: THE TENSIONS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 
Capitalist democracy welds together two quite different principles 
for generating answers to the basic problems of social coordination: Who 
plays what roles in cooperation, who gets what resources in distribution, 
and who has what authority in the political decisions that set the rules of 
further cooperation and distribution?45 Capitalist ordering, based on the 
private ownership of productive resources (including labor power) and 
their market-mediated allocation in pursuit of the highest marginal 
return, tends persistently to produce inequality in wealth and income.46 
It also produces class stratification, as different social groups play differ-
ent roles, from investor and rentier to professional and laborer.47 
                                                                                                                           
 45. This is a fairly conventional account of the questions any system of social coopera-
tion must answer. See, e.g., Barrington Moore, Jr., Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience 
and Revolt 9 (1978) (dividing the problem of social coordination into problems of authority, 
division of labor, and allocation of goods and services). 
 46. See Wolfgang Streeck, Crises, supra note 32, at 74–75 (characterizing the “capital-
ist” half of capitalist democracy as governed by a “principle[] . . . of resource allocation . . . 
operating according to marginal productivity, or what is revealed as merit by a ‘free play of 
market forces’”); David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 629–44 
(2014) (reviewing Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014)) (summarizing Piketty’s findings of persistent, cross-national, multicentury 
trends toward increasing inequality of both income and wealth). 
 47. See Grewal, supra note 46, at 632 (summarizing Piketty’s diagnosis of class strati-
fication under a system of “patrimonial capitalism” in which inherited wealth creates a 
sizable rentier class). This class-stratified division of labor is not unique to capitalist socie-
ties and in fact has characterized all industrial societies, including the authoritarian 
socialist regimes of the Soviet bloc. See, e.g., Kazimierz M. Słomczyński & Irina Tomescu-
Dubrow, Class Structure and Social Stratification in Poland from the 1970s to the 2010s, in 
Dynamics of Class and Stratification in Poland 39, 39–65 (Irina Tomescu-Dubrow et al. 
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Democratic ordering, by contrast, presents a principle of majority 
decisionmaking by members of a community of political equals.48 To give 
a democratic response to the basic problems of social coordination is to 
say that the terms of cooperation and distribution must ultimately take 
their legitimacy from the collective decision of a community of equals, 
such as a principle of “social need or entitlement, as certified by the 
collective choices of democratic politics.”49 A democratic polity might 
have good reason to embrace market allocation for any number of pur-
poses, but the use of markets would have its justification in a collective 
choice among equals; democracy would have to come first. The relation 
between the two principles of capitalist democracy is particularly fraught 
in the allocation of political authority to set the rules of cooperation and 
distribution.50 Wealth and class stratification tend constantly to under-
mine the equality of citizens (which is always artificial and legally consti-
tuted), giving certain classes (the wealthy, professionals, investors) the 
capacity to set political agendas and control important decisions.51 This 
overriding of the democratic principle by its capitalist competitor is the 
                                                                                                                           
eds., 2018) (providing a sociological overview of these dynamics under Soviet-bloc social-
ism and subsequent capitalism). The tensions in relation to American-style capitalist 
democracy, however, are especially acute. 
 48. See Streeck, Crises, supra note 32, at 75 (characterizing the “democratic” half of 
capitalist democracy as governed by a principle “based on social need or entitlement, as 
certified by the collective choices of democratic politics”). This is not merely a conceptual 
stipulation. As David Grewal and I have recently argued, democratic authorization of poli-
tical power constitutes not just the ethical core of American constitutionalism’s conception 
of legality but also the very foundation and structure of the Constitution’s authority. See 
David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127 Yale 
L.J. 664, 681–90 (2018) [hereinafter Grewal & Purdy, Original Theory] (reviewing Richard 
Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of Modern Democracy (2016)). While a 
sociological description such as Streeck’s captures essential difficulties in capitalist demo-
cracy, these difficulties arise and present the questions I am exploring here specifically 
because of the constitutional commitment to democratic self-rule. 
 49. Streeck, Crises, supra note 32, at 75. While I find Streeck’s characterization an 
invaluable shorthand, I don’t mean to follow him, or the Polanyian tradition in which he 
writes, in sometimes seeming to essentialize the national community in ways that can invite 
perceived affinities with dangerous forms of nationalism. See Grewal & Purdy, Original 
Theory, supra note 48, at 666–73 (explaining that the polity of democratic constitutional-
ism is an artificial, legally constituted entity—though no less real for that, a point that 
should be not at all mysterious to lawyers); Adam Tooze, A General Logic of Crisis, 
London Rev. Books (Jan. 5, 2017) (reviewing Streeck, How Will Capitalism End?, supra note 
46), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n01/adam-tooze/a-general-logic-of-crisis [http://perma.cc/ 
3ACT-QFV5] (arguing that Streeck strays toward this essentialization). 
 50. Cf. Streeck, Crises, supra note 32, at 76 (“[T]heories of political economy . . . 
recognize market allocation as just one type of political-economic regime, governed by the 
interests of those . . . in a strong market position. An alternative regime, political alloca-
tion, is preferred by those with little economic weight but potentially extensive political 
power.”). 
 51. See Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political 
Power in America 1 (2012) (“The American government does respond to the public’s 
preferences, but that responsiveness is strongly tilted toward the most affluent citizens.”). 
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perennial tendency of capitalist democracy. American democracy demon-
strates the tendency well. 
A.  Distributional Contests and Class Entrenchment 
American democracy is profoundly divided along class lines. 
Professor Martin Gilens concluded, summing up his own research and 
that of others, that “under most circumstances, the preferences of the 
vast majority of Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which 
policies the government does or doesn’t adopt.”52 The policy preferences 
of wealthy Americans diverge systematically from those of the general 
public: Significantly smaller shares of the wealthy support substantial 
redistribution (17% versus 52%), national health insurance (32% versus 
61%), affordable college (28% versus 78%), and a living wage (40% ver-
sus 78%).53 Elected representatives themselves are predominantly profes-
sional or wealthy. Less than two percent of members of the U.S. Congress 
entered politics from blue-collar jobs.54 It is estimated that at least half of 
congresspersons are millionaires and that the median net worth of a 
member of Congress is over $1 million.55 The disproportionate repre-
sentation of the wealthy reinforces their disparate influence: “[L]awmakers 
                                                                                                                           
 52. Id.; see also Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the 
New Gilded Age 242–44 (2d ed. 2016) (finding that the political views of the poor had 
almost no influence on Senate roll call votes during the 112th Congress); Martin Gilens & 
Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and 
Average Citizens, 12 Persp. on Pol. 564, 572 (2014) (finding that nonwealthy and unor-
ganized voters wield almost no political influence). But see Yosef Bhatti & Robert S. 
Erikson, How Poorly Are the Poor Represented in the U.S. Senate?, in Who Gets 
Represented? 223, 223–24 (Peter K. Enns & Christopher Wlezien eds., 2011) (“[W]e do 
not challenge Bartels’s finding of unequal representation as necessarily incorrect. We do, 
however, offer what we believe to be compelling reasons to interpret the evidence with 
considerable caution.”). See generally Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and 
the Erosion of Checks and Balances, 18 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 419, 421 (2015) (summarizing 
data on inequality and arguing that the U.S. government is appropriately understood as 
captured by the wealthy). With regard to the debate just noted, my claims about class 
entrenchment do not depend on Gilens and Page’s conclusion that the wealthy nearly 
always prevail in policy contests. I claim only that political power is profoundly unequal. 
 53. See Benjamin I. Page, Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the 
Policy Preferences of Wealthy Americans, 11 Persp. on Pol. 51, 57–64 (2013). This finding 
cannot really be considered authoritative, as it is based on interviews with eighty-three 
wealthy individuals in the Chicago area, but data on this issue are scarce. See id. at 53 
(describing the methodology behind these findings). 
 54. See Nicholas Carnes, White-Collar Government: The Hidden Role of Class in 
Economic Policy Making 7–20 (2013) (summarizing findings that over the past century no 
more than two percent of members of Congress have been members of the working class 
and that from 1999 to 2008 only six percent of members of Congress had spent any time at 
all in blue-collar jobs). 
 55. See Russ Choma, One Member of Congress = 18 American Households: Lawmakers’ 
Personal Finances Far from Average, OpenSecrets.org (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.opensecrets. 
org/news/2015/01/one-member-of-congress-18-american-households-lawmakers-personal-finances-
far-from-average/ [http://perma.cc/FK96-ABRN]. 
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from different classes tend to think, vote, and advocate differently on 
economic issues,”56 with working-class representatives more likely to 
support progressive economic legislation and to attend to the priorities 
of less wealthy constituents.57 
The influence that wealth exercises over political judgment is not 
mostly transactional—not a matter of bribes—but structural and social. It 
is structural in the sense that costly campaigns require constant infusions 
of money, and political representatives and their staffers know where to 
secure it.58 It is structural, too, in that a high-dollar influence industry 
creates an increasing overlap in personnel between politics and lobbying, 
as politicians who have relied on money directed from the influence 
industry during their elected careers move over to influence brokering 
upon leaving office.59 The social character of unequal influence is a prod-
uct of these structural characteristics. Those who hold power know, listen 
to, care about, and identify with those who—like them—have money.60 
This is a form of class entrenchment. Reflecting on it suggests that 
class entrenchment arises readily under capitalist democracy and may 
even be fairly described as the default form of politics under that regime. 
The reasons for this are not obscure. The American political situation 
just described is an instance of a general tendency. Capitalist economies 
tend, historically and today, toward high and growing levels of economic 
inequality.61 An economy that distributes gains unequally tends to pro-
duce successful constituencies that want to sustain their success.62 They 
have the means to do so by virtue of being economically advantaged.63 
The policies they support maintain or amplify the inequality-producing 
dynamics that generated their advantages in the first place.64 The pattern 
                                                                                                                           
 56. Carnes, supra note 54, at 3. 
 57. See id. at 71–82 (summarizing the distinctive priorities of working-class representatives). 
 58. See Zephyr Teachout, Corruption in America 246–57 (2014) (setting out the 
various ways in which the need for money directs the efforts and attention of politicians). 
 59. See id. at 246–47 (explaining that in 1970 only three percent of congressional 
representatives entered lobbying upon leaving office, whereas today that figure is over fifty 
percent). 
 60. See Bartels, supra note 52, at 301–05 (describing the narrow and class-stratified 
world of social contact and influence that shaped Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s 
response to the 2008 financial crisis in the course of the Obama Administration’s 2009 
policymaking efforts); Teachout, supra note 58, at 249–53 (describing the gift economy of 
the wealthy and influential). 
 61. See Grewal, supra note 46, at 629–42 (summarizing findings to this effect). 
 62. See Page, Bartels & Seawright, supra note 53, at 67 (discussing how many political 
preferences of wealthy Americans can be explained by their interest in protecting personal 
wealth). 
 63. See Gilens & Page, supra note 52, at 572 (“[E]conomic elites are estimated to 
have a quite substantial, highly significant, independent impact on policy.”). 
 64. See Carnes, supra note 54, at 111–20 (“Even when high-stakes economic legisla-
tion is on the line, lawmakers from different classes think and vote differently. . . . [I]n a 
class-balanced Congress, businesses probably would have enjoyed fewer tax breaks and 
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of class advantage will, of course, differ from polity to polity, depending 
in part on the ways in which economic power may be converted to poli-
tical influence, and vice versa. For instance, campaign donation limits that 
are impossible to reach for most voters but within the reach of professionals 
and executives will empower a nexus of those classes and political brokers 
clustered around parties or their proxies, while unlimited independent 
expenditures will empower very wealthy political entrepreneurs such as 
Sheldon Adelson and Thomas Steyer.65 The goal of the campaign finance 
legislation reviewed and weakened in Buckley v. Valeo was to empower a 
mix of parties and dedicated volunteers—the archetypical protagonists of 
“civil society”—to the relative disadvantage of large donors and spenders.66 
In seeking to avert incumbent and partisan entrenchment, the 
Court has developed a First Amendment jurisprudence that shields and 
fosters class entrenchment. It has also made class entrenchment constitu-
tionally invisible by characterizing political spending as serving equal 
citizenship rather than undercutting it, defining the structural charac-
teristics of class entrenchment as insufficiently problematic to justify 
campaign-finance regulation, and declaring constitutionally out of 
bounds the redistribution of political influence toward greater equality.67 
Such redistribution is the signal means for a polity to assert democracy 
against the default drift toward class entrenchment.68 Appreciating the 
structural character of class entrenchment and the role of political 
spending in it helps to underscore that actively pursuing political equality 
is the only alternative to that default drift. The Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence simultaneously knocks out this buttress of democracy and 
obscures why a polity would need it in the first place. 
This is what makes the Court’s characterization of capitalist demo-
cracy ideological. Its characterization of capitalist democracy generally, 
its praise of market-modeled elections, and its wariness of partisan and 
incumbent entrenchment might, taken alone, be characterized as an 
imaginary, or a worldview, or simply a set of heuristics: a way of organizing 
                                                                                                                           
would have had to shoulder more of the economic fallout from unforeseeable events 
[between 1999 and 2008].”). 
 65. See generally Robert G. Kaiser, So Much Damn Money: The Triumph of Lobbying 
and the Erosion of American Government 3–24 (2009) (detailing the extent of spending in 
politics); Top Individual Contributors: All Federal Contributions, OpenSecrets.org, https:// 
www.opensecrets.org/overview/topindivs.php [http://perma.cc/K8VJ-BKUQ] (last visited Aug. 
14, 2018) (listing Adelson and Steyer among the top individual contributors in the 2018 
election cycle). 
 66. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1976) (per curiam) (characterizing the 
statute under review, the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)); Richard Briffault, 
The Federal Election Campaign Act and the 1980 Election, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 2083, 2083 
(1984) (reviewing Herbert E. Alexander, Financing the 1980 Election (1983) and Elizabeth 
Drew, Politics and Money (1983)) (“The central thrust of FECA was to move the campaign 
finance process in a more egalitarian and public direction.”). 
 67. See supra section I.A. 
 68. See infra section II.B.3. 
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institutions and events into certain patterns of salience, highlighting 
certain priorities and dangers and discounting others.69 All social prac-
tices, including forms of reasoning such as legal argument and academic 
inquiry, occur within imaginative frames of this kind.70 When I say that 
the court’s characterization is ideology, I mean something more. These 
judicial characterizations obscure central features of social and political 
reality and, indeed, render them legally unintelligible in ways that 
facilitate class entrenchment while denying the basic tension within capi-
talist democracy. To say that jurisprudence is ideological is to say that it 
mischaracterizes social and political reality by denying one or more of its 
constitutive conflicts and, at the same time, takes sides in those conflicts.71 
B.  Principles for a Democratic First Amendment 
So, what should an egalitarian First Amendment jurisprudence do? 
This section addresses this question through a characterization of self-
rule under capitalist democracy. 
1. Neutrality, Right and Wrong. — The first step is to recognize that class 
entrenchment is a perennial tendency of capitalist democracy and arises from 
the tensions between the regime’s two competing principles of social coor-
dination.72 Appreciating this makes clear that, in one sense, the jurisprudential 
goal of enforcing state neutrality via the First Amendment is a chimera. 
                                                                                                                           
 69. See generally Jedediah Purdy, After Nature 6–7 (2015) (“Imagination means how 
we see and how we learn to see, how we suppose the world works, how we suppose that it 
matters, and what we feel we have at stake in it. It is an implicit, everyday metaphysics . . . 
[in which] some facts stand out . . . while others recede . . . .”); Charles Taylor, A Secular 
Age 171–76 (2007) (setting out a philosophical account of the role of a “social imaginary” 
in organizing experience). 
 70. See, e.g., 2 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers: Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences 21–28 (1985) (challenging the “epistemological orientation which would rule 
interpretation out of the sciences of man”). 
 71. See Karl Marx, The German Ideology: Part I, in The Marx-Engels Reader 146, 
148–55 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (suggesting that in ideology “men and their 
circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura”); see also Jorge Larrain, The 
Concept of Ideology 60–61 (1979) (“[I]deology is reaffirmed as a consciousness which 
conceals contradictions in the interest of the dominant class. The inverted character of 
ideological consciousness corresponds to the real inversion of social relations . . . .”). 
Marx’s definition of ideology as obscuring social reality is very stark, and any strict applica-
tion of it requires a firm idea of what exactly counts as “social reality.” I do not, in general, 
share the young Marx’s confidence that patterned and discernible material relations are 
the genuine stuff of social life and liberal interpretations the mere ideological dressing. 
See Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 20–21 (Maurice Dobb 
ed., S.W. Ryazanskaya trans., Int’l Publishers 1970) (1859) (“The totality of these relations 
of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which 
arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness.”). Having said that, however, the basic tensions of capitalist democracy are 
so foundational, and their obscuring so significant, that a starker characterization of the 
situation seems justified. See infra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 72. See generally Streeck, Crises, supra note 32, at 74–75 (outlining the capitalist and 
democratic principles that perpetually compete in capitalist democracies). 
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Any doctrinal elaboration of the First Amendment will both presuppose 
and advance a specific dynamic between the twinned principles of capitalist 
democracy. Among other effects, any version of the First Amendment will 
tend to facilitate or impede certain forms of class entrenchment. 
This is not to say that neutrality is impossible or undesirable in doc-
trine or that decisions must be outcome oriented according to the 
Justices’ feelings about specific cases.73 If neutrality means avoiding this 
caricature of unprincipled decisionmaking, then neutrality is both desira-
ble and achievable. But such neutrality has multiple possible forms. It 
might be consistent with neutrality to permit no private expenditure on 
political campaigns, relying on public financing and the strength of 
volunteer efforts and other shows of popular support. Alternatively, neu-
trality might require the doctrines of Buckley and Citizens United.74 It might 
be, too, that the best version of neutrality would start from a constitu-
tional presumption that campaign-finance regulation is legitimate, sub-
ject to some constraint of reasonableness.75 Any of these doctrines would 
be neutral both (1) in the formal sense that they do not require free-
roaming, case-by-case judicial decisions about the distribution of political 
power and (2) in the substantive sense that they implement a version of the 
idea that the state is obliged not to make invidious distinctions among 
citizens.76 None, however, would be neutral in the sense of implying no 
attitude toward the competing tendencies of capitalist democracy: eco-
nomic inequality and political equality. An egalitarian First Amendment 
jurisprudence should seek a version of neutrality that aims at supporting 
political equality against economic inequality. 
2. Democratic Will Formation. — A First Amendment jurisprudence 
concerned to foster, or at least not inhibit, the vitality of democratic 
equality must be oriented toward collective will formation that allows the 
majority to rule. The self-legislation of the majority, binding for all, is the 
normative core of modern constitutional democracy.77 Constitutional 
                                                                                                                           
 73. But cf. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 75 & n.22 (1980) (arguing against a 
claim for the judicial redistribution of voting power by denying the possibility of 
identifying a legitimate distributional principle). 
 74. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text. 
 75. This is basically the position that Justice Stevens recommends adopting by con-
stitutional amendment, a recourse he advises only because of the Court’s spending-
protective precedents in this area. See John Paul Stevens, Six Amendments: How and Why 
We Should Change the Constitution 57–80 (2014). 
 76. See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 199–201 (1986) (explaining the essential role 
in legal legitimacy of equal concern and respect for the interests and perspectives of those 
governed—that is, the second sense of neutrality); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale 
L.J. 509, 539 (1988) (explaining that the virtue of the first sense of neutrality lies in “dis-
abling certain classes of decisionmakers from making certain kinds of decisions”). 
 77. See Grewal & Purdy, Original Theory, supra note 48, at 683 (explaining that con-
ceptual and institutional innovations enabled a “new practice of popular authorship of fun-
damental law by the political community” in eighteenth-century constitutional thought); 
see also Jack M. Balkin, Republicanism and the Constitution of Opportunity, 94 Tex. L. 
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interpretation should take place with an eye to sustaining the conditions 
of popular sovereignty, preventing the drift of government into deep or 
irremediable elite usurpation.78 
Collective will formation requires that the political process be able to 
resolve disputes by authoritative decisions connected with a conception 
of the common good.79 While the content of any “common good” is 
notoriously indeterminate and, indeed, would contradict self-rule were it 
neatly fixed in advance, politics must be able to produce an account of the 
common good that will be generally recognized as legitimate even as it is 
contested through further politics. The political production of a com-
mon good becomes impossible if citizens pervasively mistrust the results 
of the political process—for instance, if they doubt the objectivity of 
voting, they regard the system as irremediably rigged by such means as 
gerrymandering and influence peddling, or they come to regard their 
political opponents as so essentially hostile to their values and interests as 
to be disqualified from sharing in any common good.80 For a democratic 
republic to produce such an account of the common good, there must 
be no pervasive exclusion from political participation, and the distribu-
tion of political influence must not be so marked by inequality that the 
majority of people who must live under the law cannot regard themselves 
in any serious sense as having authorized it.81 A democratic republic 
                                                                                                                           
Rev. 1427, 1431–37 (2016) (defining republican government by reference to principles 
including self-rule, the common good, and civic equality). My assertion above the line 
obviously implicates a deep and long-running body of debate in political thought, which I 
do not pretend to survey. My goal here is to set out a normative orientation with strong 
roots in both the U.S. constitutional tradition and the general theory of capitalist 
democracy. 
 78. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 77, at 1435–37 (identifying republicanism with anti-
corruption and antientrenchment principles). 
 79. Cf. id. at 1433 (explaining that republicanism relies on a notion of the common 
good). 
 80. See Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die 102–44 (2018) 
(exploring the potential of polarization to undermine liberal democracy by eroding 
mutual toleration and institutional forbearance). 
 81. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 77, at 1433–34, 1437–39 (arguing that republicanism 
emphasizes both civic equality and a good constitutional structure, including in the realm 
of political economy); Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 
94 B.U. L. Rev. 669, 687–96 (2014) (“Extreme concentrations of economic and political 
power undermine equal citizenship and equal opportunity. In this way, oligarchy is incom-
patible with, and a threat to, the American constitutional scheme.”); Ganesh Sitaraman, 
Economic Structure and Constitutional Structure: An Intellectual History, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 
1301, 1319–27 (2016) (arguing that the Founders believed that “relative economic equal-
ity was necessary for republican government”). By this standard, the United States failed in 
important ways to be a democratic republic rather than a Herrenvolk republic before the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and its democratic status is thrown into doubt today by racial 
inequality in wealth, education, and criminal justice; by mass incarceration, especially 
when accompanied by disenfranchisement; and by the presence of a large population of 
unauthorized migrants who live under the laws of the United States but play hardly any 
part in their production or authorization. See Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
2013–2014 Civil Rights Data Collection: A First Look 3–8 (2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
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requires for its legitimacy the consent of living generations, not simply 
the inheritance of past political acts. Any government that prevents the 
current political community from renewing or revising its own basic 
commitments usurps popular sovereignty.82 
Constitutional interpretation can play only a relatively modest part 
in any program to achieve these conditions, and this goes a fortiori for 
the interpretation of any one part of the Constitution, such as the First 
Amendment.83 That being said, the First Amendment has come to be 
closely connected with the structure of political contests, and there are 
significant stakes in its interpretation. At present, First Amendment doc-
trine presents a substantial barrier to popular sovereignty–renewing 
measures. An alternative approach should lead First Amendment juris-
prudence to permit, even facilitate, the renewal of popular sovereignty, 
partly by linking the desiderata of democratic will formation to an 
account of the political economy of capitalist democracy that is both 
more realistic about market ordering and more committed to the pre-
rogatives of a democratic polity. 
3. Necessary Redistribution. — Democracy requires the deliberate and 
ongoing adjustment of economic power—distributional judgment.84 The 
posture of distribution-blind neutrality that the Court has adopted in the 
First Amendment cases discussed here implicitly approves ways of con-
testing democratic will formation that tend to undercut democracy by 
                                                                                                                           
offices/list/ocr/docs/2013-14-first-look.pdf [https://perma.cc/TP8P-ETAR] (identifying racial 
inequalities in U.S. public education in contexts such as school discipline, access to high-
level math and science courses, and chronic absenteeism); Jenny Gathright, Forget Wealth 
and Neighborhood. The Racial Income Gap Persists, Nat’l Pub. Radio: Code Switch (Mar. 
19, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2018/03/19/594993620/forget-wealth-
and-neighborhood-the-racial-income-gap-persists (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(“[I]n 99 percent of neighborhoods in the United States, black boys earn less in adulthood 
than white boys who come from similar socioeconomic backgrounds[,] . . . undermin[ing] 
the widely-held belief that class, not race, is the most fundamental predictor of economic 
outcomes for children in the U.S.”); Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the 
2010 Census: State-by-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, Prison Policy Initiative 
(May 28, 2014), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html [https://perma.cc/6L9Q-
ZT27] (“Nationally, according to the U.S. Census, Blacks are incarcerated five times more 
than Whites are, and Hispanics are nearly twice as likely to be incarcerated as Whites[.]”). 
 82. See Grewal & Purdy, Original Theory, supra note 48, at 681–91 (outlining the 
origins and logic of this principle). 
 83. Cf. Leslie Kendrick, Another First Amendment, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 2095, 2112 
(2018) (“The goal of seeking a more egalitarian First Amendment is, first and foremost, to 
achieve a more egalitarian society. I doubt whether this tail can wag that dog.”). 
 84. See, e.g., John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 97 (1971) (“[A]s far as possible the 
basic structure [of society] should be appraised from the position of equal citizenship.”); 
id. at 277–80 (noting the need for ongoing redistribution to maintain “the fair value of 
the equal liberties,” that is, to make formal liberty a meaningful basis for a more robust 
equality among citizens); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 291–303 (1983) (“At a certain 
point in the development of an enterprise, then, it must pass out of entrepreneurial con-
trol; it must be organized or reorganized in some political way, according to the prevailing 
(democratic) conception of how power ought to be distributed.”). 
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systemically amplifying the influence of the wealthy and super wealthy 
and (as discussed in the next Part) weakening workers’ and others’ capa-
city to organize themselves for collective action.85 
An egalitarian First Amendment jurisprudence would be marked by 
a willingness to accept certain risks on behalf of democratic self-rule. Part 
of the reason a democratic polity rules itself is so that it can address con-
stitutional questions in an ongoing fashion: how its self-rule shall happen, 
what forms of economic power shall register in political life, and what 
some of the terms of cooperation shall be among social members.86 A 
polity can decide, for instance, to favor time-intensive and face-to-face 
activity over costly and heavily mediated forms of argument. In fact, that 
is just the sort of decision democratic republics should be able to make 
over their own future practices. 
Lawmaking inevitably and appropriately structures the political pro-
cess to build up the constituencies and institutions that will channel 
energy and mobilization into future will formation. Democratic institu-
tions iteratively reproduce and revise themselves.87 If they are judicially 
impeded from revisiting the terms of self-rule, then other forces will 
establish those terms through drift, the accretion of economic power, 
and the strategic self-organizing of advantaged industries and classes.88 
The configuration of economic power in relation to political power does 
not stand still over time, and someone (really, many persons and institu-
tions) will give it a shape. If a political community cannot do this work, 
the work will still happen by other means and on other terms. An egal-
itarian First Amendment need not empower judicial prescription of basic 
distributional questions, but it requires judicial recognition of the demo-
cratic prerogative to answer those questions. 
4. Process and Substance: Democracy and Social Democracy. — Constitu-
tional jurisprudence is connected with the substance of the economic 
order that it authorizes. New Deal jurisprudence authorized a regime of 
partial corporatism, extensive unionization, social provision through an 
interweaving of state and private (often employer-based) obligations, and 
economic planning.89 It was not only a jurisprudence about the scope 
                                                                                                                           
 85. See infra notes 98–107 and accompanying text. 
 86. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Seyla Benhabib, Democratic Iterations: The Local, the National, and the 
Global, in Another Cosmopolitanism 41, 41–44 (Robert Post ed., 2006) (illustrating how 
“democratic iterations” mediate the will formation of democratic majorities). These insti-
tutions need not be representative or permanent, like legislatures, but may also include 
such institutional majoritarian practices as elections and constitutional referenda. 
 88. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
 89. See William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 Duke L.J. 165, 166 
(2001) (“The constitutional vision New Dealers championed . . . held that all Americans had 
rights to decent work and livelihoods, social provision, and a measure of economic 
democracy, including rights on the part of wage-earning Americans to organize and 
bargain collectively with employers.”). See generally Gérard Duménil & Dominique Lévy, 
The Crisis of Neoliberalism 281–93 (2011) (describing the main tenets of the New Deal as 
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and forms of self-rule in an industrial economy, as official functionalist 
narrations tended to have it.90 It was also a jurisprudence of permission 
for (a modest and flawed) social democracy.91 Conversely, as sketched 
earlier, the current jurisprudence of distributional neutrality shares its 
origins with discourses, polemics, and programs that were aimed at 
blocking and rolling back the statist egalitarianism of the New Deal and 
the Great Society, which its critics recast as a form of corrupting interest-
group entrenchment.92 
There are many reasons for a polity to deploy markets as its basic eco-
nomic mode, from efficiency to personal autonomy.93 But it is quite an-
other thing for the same polity to constrain itself constitutionally to give 
the resulting economic arrangements a major role in its future political 
will formation.94 When market ordering is constitutionalized in this 
fashion, it tends to move from being part of a menu of governing strategies 
that a political community might adopt and pursue to being itself a key 
determinant of which options even appear on the menu, let alone get 
chosen.95 Constitutionally forbidding ongoing engagement with the 
structure of economic and political power takes away much of democracy’s 
reason for being. 
The stakes of self-rule for citizens (and noncitizen social members) 
in capitalist democracy include taming or eliminating arbitrary and over-
weening exercises and concentrations of power and building up the con-
ditions of dignified, unfrightened existence and activity in a community 
of relative equals. At any time, these goals take specific institutional 
forms—unions, election laws, universal health care, the creation of public 
                                                                                                                           
the federal regulation of labor relations, the implementation of large public-works 
programs, and the protection of workers’ rights to unionize and collectively bargain). 
 90. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–29 (1942) (finding that the Commerce 
Clause authorized regulation of wheat production on the basis of its aggregate effect on 
interstate commerce). 
 91. See Forbath, supra note 89, at 166. I do not mean to deny either the many flaws 
of what we call “the New Deal” or its complexity and variety. See, e.g., Ira Katznelson, Fear 
Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time 156–94 (2013) (outlining how the reach 
and radicalism of New Deal reforms were limited by compromises with Jim Crow 
segregation). 
 92. See supra section I.B. 
 93. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 8 (2d ed. 1982) (“Economic 
arrangements play a dual role in the promotion of a free society. On the one hand, free-
dom in economic arrangements is itself a component of freedom broadly understood . . . . 
In the second place, economic freedom is also an indispensable means toward the achieve-
ment of political freedom.”); id. at 167 (“[T]he essential function of payment in accord-
ance with product in a market society is to enable resources to be allocated efficiently 
without compulsion . . . .”). 
 94. For a summary of the ways in which these values may interact in various market 
arrangements, see Jedediah Purdy, The Meaning of Property 123–27 (2010) (drawing on 
and applying Professor Amartya Sen’s account of the kinds of values that markets may 
serve). 
 95. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
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utilities, guarantees against harassment and exploitation—and consti-
tutional adjudication turns, accordingly, to whether such measures are 
required, favored, permitted, or forbidden. Today the issue seems to 
many of us to be a choice between oligarchy and a democratic-republican 
renewal.96 To rework the link between economic and political concentra-
tions of power, that renewal may have to move from the market-inflected 
state skepticism of the 1970s and 1980s to a posture that understands the 
mutual constituting of political and economic citizenship in terms that 
are more social democratic and more committed to the organized power 
of working people and mobilized citizens in contradistinction to wealth 
and capital than any that has counted for much in recent decades. We 
should consider what it might be like, not just to grit our teeth and 
acknowledge this conclusion as a lesson foisted on jurisprudence by recent 
political science and macroeconomics, but to embrace it as part of the 
horizon of a possible better world. 
This Part has framed First Amendment jurisprudence within the 
context of capitalist democracy, arguing for the necessity of the redis-
tributive policy that Buckley anathematized and for a conception of 
neutrality that aims explicitly at maintaining a certain relation between 
economic and political ordering, rather than allowing one to emerge by 
default. The full implications of this view, of course, are beyond the scope 
of a single Essay. The next Part offers one application: a diagnosis of the 
Court’s recent treatment of public-sector union fees as a threat to free 
expression and an alternative view that understands such fees as essential 
parts of building the class power that is necessary in a capitalist demo-
cracy if it is to remain democratic. It shows, moreover, that this idea is not 
alien to American jurisprudence. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter believed 
something along these lines.97 
III. UNION FEES AND THE SHAPE OF ECONOMIC POWER: 
FURTHER DEFINING THE ALTERNATIVES 
In June 2018, the Court ruled in Janus v. AFSCME that the First 
Amendment forbids public-sector unions from charging nonmember 
public employees in their bargaining units “agency fees” for employment-
related services and advocacy.98 The Court framed the issue as one of 
individual liberty from state compulsion. Justice Alito invoked Justice 
Jackson’s great phrase, “[N]o official . . . can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
                                                                                                                           
 96. See, e.g., Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 81, at 670–73 (positing democratic 
political economy as a counterweight and alternative to oligarchy); Sitaraman, supra note 
81, at 1304 (same). 
 97. See infra notes 116–120 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2459–60 (2018). 
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force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”99 Justice Alito 
warned, “Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they 
find objectionable is always demeaning.”100 
As in the political-spending cases discussed in Part I, the Court 
invoked the dangers of entrenchment and self-dealing, noting that the 
case arose from a political context in which Illinois had nearly $160 bil-
lion in unfunded pension and retiree healthcare liabilities and sought in 
bargaining to drive down employee costs.101 The defendant union instead 
“advocated wage and tax increases, cutting spending ‘to Wall Street 
financial institutions,’” and other left-of-center measures.102 Justice Alito’s 
opinion presented these events as evidence that “[w]hat unions have to 
say . . . in the context of collective bargaining is of great public 
importance” and amounts to political speech that agency fees subsidize.103 
It further noted that collective bargaining can involve “controversial 
subjects such as climate change, the Confederacy, [and] sexual orientation 
and gender identity.”104 Justice Alito’s questioning in oral argument 
signaled alignment with the Hayek–Friedman–Powell line of concern 
about the proliferation of redistributionist policies that might stem from 
the entrenchment of political influence. He worried aloud that an 
empowered public-sector union might “push a city to the brink and 
perhaps over the brink into bankruptcy.”105 
Oral argument also indicated that at least one of the Justices who joined 
Justice Alito’s opinion understood the agency-fee requirement in Janus as 
a violation of the anti-redistribution principle of Buckley. Justice Kennedy 
pushed the union’s lawyer toward the concession that the fee amounted 
to an impermissible redistribution of political speech and thus posed a 
danger of entrenchment. Justice Kennedy pressed AFSCME’s lawyers to 
acknowledge that, “if you do not prevail in this case, the unions will have 
less political influence.”106 When David Frederick conceded the point, 
Justice Kennedy replied, “Isn’t that the end of this case?”107 That is to say, 
if the requirement to pay agency fees shapes the political playing field by 
directing resources to union advocacy, it must violate the First Amendment. 
Janus, then, has the same logic as the political-spending cases. At its 
core is the plaintiff who wishes to determine how his money is disbursed 
                                                                                                                           
 99. Id. at 2463 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 2474–75 (recounting the budget problems in Illinois). 
 102. Id. at 2475 (quoting Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 33 Pub. 
Emp. Rep. for Ill. ¶ 67 (Ill. Labor Relations Bd. 2016), 2016 WL 7645201). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 2476 (footnotes omitted). 
 105. Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (No. 16-1466), 2018 WL 
1383160. 
 106. Id. at 54. 
 107. Id. 
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and who connects his money with constitutionally protected speech by 
showing its relevance to political debate. The individual-rights core of the 
opinion is buttressed by the structural worry that the challenged regime 
distributes the power of political influence in a way that entrenches cer-
tain established interests, here public-sector unions. The worry about 
distribution and entrenchment of political influence is linked, in turn, 
with a specific political outcome that is to be avoided: an empowered set 
of public employees with an agenda of egalitarian redistribution. Public-
sector unions are cast here in the same role as the self-entrenching offi-
cials and bureaucrats who figured as the bête noire of the Buckley-era 
turn to an anti-redistributionist First Amendment doctrine. 
A.  The Court’s View of Workers’ Interests, and an Alternative 
The assumption that the associational interest to be protected in 
unions’ membership and political activity is a negative and individual 
one—an opt-out108—excludes a different way of understanding the rela-
tionship of organized labor to democratic will formation. The interest in 
refusing unwanted associations is a privacy interest, one that has great 
power in many legal domains, from the common law guarantee against 
physical invasion to the personal rights of substantive due process.109 But is 
the institutional structure of bargaining power and political advocacy that 
connects large employers with large bodies of workers best understood as a 
domain of private and voluntary relations, or as a domain of shared arrange-
ments in which participation is in some important respects ineluctable 
once one is in the workplace? If the economy is a concert of individuals, 
orchestrated by personal choice, then privacy rights are consonant with 
it.110 But on a different view, class structure is part of this economy. Who 
occupies what role is, of course, decided by the interplay of personal choice 
and social structure.111 But that there will be employers and employees, 
investors, and day laborers, is—for now—fate.112 
                                                                                                                           
 108. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463 (“The right to eschew association for expressive 
purposes is likewise protected.”). 
 109. Cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–78 (1990) (describing 
the common law protection against unwanted contact as a basis for a right to refuse 
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of sexual partners). 
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 112. See, e.g., G.A. Cohen, The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom, 12 Phil. & Pub. 
Aff. 3, 11–12 (1983) (arguing that individual mobility does not alter the “collective unfreedom” 
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It is because of shared fate that processes of collective will formation 
become essential. To begin with an analogy to the workplace, politics is 
not an optional undertaking. It is a response to the fact that for certain 
purposes people are trapped together—in shared economic regimes, 
shared regimes of legitimate violence113—and there must be some pro-
cess for determining the rules of those regimes. Democracy is, of course, 
optional, at both the individual and the systemic levels. But its efforts at 
collective will formation are an alternative not to the absence of politics 
but to a different political dispensation. The right way to see unions, on 
this view, is as akin to political subcommunities. A vote on unionization is 
more like a constitutional referendum than it is like the election of rep-
resentatives, and once a union exists it is a forum of collective will for-
mation within its workplace, appropriately binding on all who are, so to 
speak, within that jurisdiction.114 Organized labor presents a political-eco-
nomic counterweight to wealth, an essential institution of rough civic 
equality.115 Absent clear suppression of a core interest in political speech, 
the First Amendment should not be interpreted as protecting personal 
rights that undercut this democratic institution. 
B.  Two Ways of Seeing the Inseparability of Politics and Economics 
 It is ironic that toward the end of his career in 1961, Justice 
Frankfurter took the same conceptual view of union activity that Justice 
Alito does today—that it is impossible to separate bread-and-butter eco-
nomic representation from political advocacy—while drawing the oppo-
site conclusion from that insight. For Alito, the inseparability of union 
representation from political advocacy means that even mandatory 
funding of representation is problematic under the First Amendment, 
because there is no getting politics out of it.116 Frankfurter’s course of 
reasoning was the opposite. While Alito proceeds nominally from a con-
ception of what is political speech (and so the concern of the First 
Amendment) and finds that it sweeps in all union advocacy, Frankfurter 
                                                                                                                           
of class society, which guarantees that a substantial share of people will always occupy a 
subordinate class position). 
 113. See, e.g., Jonah Birch, Ending Their Wars, Jacobin (May 28, 2018), https:// 
www.jacobinmag.com/2018/05/war-socialists-debs-vietnam-internationalism [https://perma. 
cc/Z3M8-D35F] (“In the organization of state violence on an unprecedented scale, we see 
capitalism’s tendency to subordinate human need to the logic of profit and power.”). 
 114. See Gabriel Winant, Where Did It All Go Wrong?, Nation (Feb. 7, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/organized-labors-lost-generations [https://perma.cc/ 
WTW2-JCNF] (giving this characterization of union elections). 
 115. See, e.g., James Feigenbaum et al., Opinion, Right-to-Work Laws Have Devastated 
Unions—and Democrats, N.Y. Times (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/ 
08/opinion/conor-lamb-unions-pennsylvania.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(summarizing research showing a sharp drop in electoral support for Democrats where 
state laws weaken the labor movement). 
 116. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 
2480–81 (2018). 
2018] BEYOND THE BOSSES’ CONSTITUTION 2185 
 
proceeded from the assumption that unions played a legitimate and 
important role in American self-rule and reasoned that the activity in 
which they have historically engaged should enjoy a presumption of con-
stitutionality.117 For Frankfurter, casting constitutional doubt on the 
standard legislative mechanisms for funding union advocacy “would be 
completely to ignore the long history of union conduct and its pervasive 
acceptance in our political life.”118 Frankfurter took for granted the 
fundamentally collective character of unions, with its consequence that 
they cannot do their work if they are unable to generate mandatory 
forms of collective action. He analogized the speech situation of the 
union dues payer to that of the federal taxpayer and offered as a premise 
that a union could not be said to violate its members’ speech interests 
when it called a strike.119 What, after all, would a union be if it were not a 
locus of collective action? It would be like a state that could not make 
law.120 
Frankfurter’s view serves as a coda to this discussion, and also a bridge 
to an alternative, democratic political economy in First Amendment 
doctrine. In this view, a democratic polity has an interest in structuring 
economic power and its translation into political power in ways that 
counteract the structural advantages of wealth and coordination that 
otherwise strengthen owners and employers. Institutions that balance the 
power of wealth by enabling working people to combine for effective 
advocacy—in collective bargaining and in the broader contests of 
politics—should be assumed to be compatible with First Amendment 
interests unless there is a very strong showing to the contrary. But such a 
showing must not rest on findings that a union imposes unity on the 
voices of its members, once the union has been authorized to represent 
them, nor on the worry that unions might make distributional demands 
on the state. That would be condemning them for doing their job in the 
constitutional order.   
                                                                                                                           
 117. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 812–13 (1961) (Frankfurter, 
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CONCLUSION 
Progressive engagement with First Amendment doctrine should start 
by recognizing that any plausible version of civic equality and self-rule 
requires political engagement with the terms of self-rule. If appropriately 
constituted majorities cannot decide how majorities shall rule, then 
other forces will. This point has particular bite in a regime of capitalist 
democracy, in which historical and contemporary empirics strongly sug-
gest that unequal economic power tends to grow over time and to embed 
itself in political power. Some legally ordered relationship between 
political power and economic power is not just inevitable; its substance is 
of the first importance, because only it can sustain countervailing princi-
ples of equal citizenship, common good, and self-rule. In the face of a 
candidly neoliberal jurisprudence that advances the political domination 
of the wealthy, it is all the more important to recover and develop a con-
stitutionalism of social democracy. 
